By any other name would smell as sweet...
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet
In some sense, however, words - names - DO matter.
When your friendly family physician diagnoses you with the flu, that diagnosis implies a treatment protocol: "stay home, rest, drink lots of clear liquids." A diagnosis of strep throat implies a treatment protocol including antibiotics. Gout? Still a different treatment protocol.
If friendly family physician observes symptoms of diabetes, but calls if "flu" and treats you for the flu, you could die.
So did SecDef Rumsfeld cripple our efforts in Iraq when he had his epiphany, deciding that
I've thought about it, and over the weekend, I thought to myself, "You know, that [calling them insurgents] gives them a greater legitimacy than they seem to merit." Why do you -- why would you call Zarqawi and his people insurgents against a legitimate Iraqi government with their own constitution?
If we're not fighting an insurgency, we aren't likely to employ counter-insurgency tactics and strategy.
Did this really have an impact on our conduct of the war?
We learned yesterday from USA Today that
Strategy that is making Iraq safer was snubbed for years
By Peter Eisler, Blake Morrison and Tom Vanden Brook, USA TODAY
... a USA TODAY investigation shows that the strategy now used to defeat the bombmaking networks and stabilize Iraq was ignored or rejected for years by key decision-makers. As early as 2004, when roadside bombs already were killing scores of troops, a top military consultant invited to address two dozen generals offered a "strategic alternative" for beating the insurgency and IEDs.
That plan and others mirroring the counterinsurgency blueprint that the Pentagon now hails as a success were pitched repeatedly in memos and presentations during the following two years, at meetings that included then-Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Vice President Cheney's chief of staff, Lewis "Scooter" Libby.
The core of the strategy: Clear insurgents from key areas and provide security to win over Iraqis, who would respond by helping U.S. forces break IED networks and defeat the insurgency.
Bush administration officials, however, remained wedded to the idea that training the Iraqi army and leaving the country would suffice. Officials, including Cheney, insisted the insurgency was dying. Those pronouncements delayed the Pentagon from embracing new plans to stop IEDs and investing in better armored vehicles that allow troops to patrol more freely, documents and interviews show.
Yes, words DO matter! They shape our understanding of the world and our response to the world based on that understanding!
Added bonus: in a few previous posts I've noted that Pentagon's addiction to high-tech has been counter-productive. The USA Today cited above reinforces this opinion, going on to say...
Even after the Pentagon began committing substantial resources to combat IEDs, USA TODAY found, its spending focused mostly on high-tech devices with limited utility. Some silver-bullet solutions, such as microwave beams designed to destroy IEDs before they blew up, never worked.
Stop the madness!
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